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DISGORGING EMOLUMENTS
CAPRICE L. ROBERTS*
This Article is about unjust enrichment. It includes a theory of an unjust
enrichment cause of action against executive actors who receive unlawful
emoluments. Interpretations of the boundaries of unlawful emoluments range
from receipt of a gift or benefit because of the position of power held to quid
pro quo exchanges of a thing of value in exchange for government information
or advantage. Wherever the proper line, the purpose of the law of unjust
enrichment is to prevent and undo benefits one has no right to retain. It
achieves those goals with the use of restitution remedies including
disgorgement of unjust profits.
Unjust enrichment is particularly suited to remedy wrongful emoluments
because the goal is to undo improper gain rather than compensate for any
plaintiff losses. Unjust enrichment law and restitution-based remedies law are
experiencing a revival in the United States. This resurgence of interest in and
use of unjust enrichment theory has led to increased application of
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Rosenbury, Danny Sokol, and Andy Wright. For continued dialogue on restitution theory and
applications, the author remains grateful to Andrew Kull and Doug Laycock. Thanks also to Brian
Frye for the opportunity to explore the concepts in this Article in a podcast discussion. Ipse Dixit,
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[https://perma.cc/UQS8-RPJY].

ROBERTS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2

11/22/2019 5:57 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[103:1

restitutionary remedies. This Article proposes the restitutionary-based remedy
of disgorgement of emoluments that constitute unjust gains. This cause of
action and remedy already lie in American common law. Unjust enrichment
provides a freestanding basis for disgorgement relief as well as restitution
remedies to protect against fiduciary breaches and violations of other protected
interests. Article III standing and other jurisdictional obstacles may pose a
need for a cleaner, additional path. No existing statutes cover this field. Thus,
I propose a statutory solution that operationalizes restitutionary disgorgement
as the preferred remedy to undo unjust emoluments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
disgorge: Yield or give up (funds, especially when dishonestly
acquired) “they were made to disgorge all the profits made
from the record”1
One of the basic tenets of good government is that public officials act on
behalf of the public interest rather than to enrich themselves at the public’s
expense. No doubt since the founding of America, government officials have
engaged in behavior that risks violation of constitutional, statutory, and ethical
prohibitions against certain emoluments. Issues of conflicts of interest,
improper gains, and recusal are not unique to modern times. Historically, such
matters have generated public criticism, advisory opinions by the Office of
Legal Counsel, administrative corrective actions, statutory amendments,
enhanced regulations, and sometimes governmental censures. These forces
include separation-of-powers tension that may help, along with accountability
to voters, lead to a satisfactory resolution of the arguably problematic conduct.
Government actors and challengers have sought regulatory and ethical
clarification of what constitutes an unlawful emolument, but this subject has
never been litigated until now.2
The sitting President of the United States maintains financial interests in
companies with hotels bearing his last name. One such hotel is in Washington,
D.C., not far from the White House. The President continues to receive profits
from that hotel, which allegedly welcomes foreign diplomats as guests. These
profits are emoluments as most broadly defined: any gain, benefit, advantage,
or profit.3 Such profits, however, may or may not be unconstitutional or
otherwise unlawful. The Justice Department maintains that such profits are not
unlawful as there is no proof that the President has done anything in exchange
for such profits.4 Government officials of prior administrations—Democratic
and Republican—have engaged in behavior raising ethical questions that

1. Disgorge,
ENGLISH
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES
(OUP),
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/disgorge [https://perma.cc/7L5T-KSGW] (“Origin Late 15th
century: from Old French desgorger, from des- (expressing removal) + gorge ‘throat.’”).
2. “Until now, the issue of what constitutes an illegal emolument has never been litigated.”
Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Questions Defense of President’s Hotel Profits, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2018,
at A18.
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. The Justice Department maintains a narrow interpretation of emoluments limited to payment
for labor and further argues that something must be given in exchange for the payment evidencing a
corrupt intent. See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp.
3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM), ECF No. 21-1.
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sometimes also triggered emoluments concerns, if not, violations.5 None of the
prior allegations, however, rose to litigation over whether certain emoluments
were in fact unlawful. Several lawsuits filed against President Trump seek to
prove that receipt of such profits—regardless of any lack of quid pro quo—are
unlawful emoluments warranting relief.6
Such emoluments controversies fill the news.7 Whether emoluments are
improper as alleged is hotly debated among scholars and pundits.8 Scholarship
5. Id. at 41–49. At the June 2018 hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the
emoluments suits, the Department of Justice emphasized that the prior administration’s commerce
secretary kept stock in Hyatt Hotels Corporation, while foreign governments rented rooms worldwide.
LaFraniere, supra note 2. Penny Pritzker was the Secretary of Commerce in President Obama’s
administration from 2013 to 2017; when nominated, Penny held a vast array of stocks and served as a
board member of Hyatt Hotels among other boards. Angel Au-Yeung, Former Secretary of Commerce
and Hyatt Hotels Heir Penny Pritzker Identified in Paradise Papers, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/angelauyeung/2017/11/05/former-secretary-of-commerce-and-hyatthotels-heir-penny-pritzker-identified-in-paradise-papers/#1ee851212618
[https://perma.cc/729QPWDL]. She drafted a letter detailing her plans to divest ownership of 221 holdings and resign from
several boards including Hyatt Hotels in order “to avoid an actual or apparent conflict of interest in the
event that [she is] confirmed for the position of Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce.” Letter
from Penny Pritzker to Barbara Fredericks, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Admin., U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce
(May
8,
2013),
https://extapps2.oge.gov/201/Presiden.nsf/PAS+Index/56D8501C3C6375D285257FC20010E4A7/%
24FILE/Penny-S-Pritzker-EA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WTH-2UZC]; see Au-Yeung, supra.
Government documents show former Secretary Pritzker claimed simply that she had sold certain
holdings; an international group of investigative journalists claim that leaked records, known as the
Paradise Papers, reveal a more complex picture regarding the path of divestment—a transfer of those
holdings to an LLC that may have been owned by trusts for Pritzker’s children. Au-Yeung, supra.
Pritzker’s spokesperson maintains that Pritzker consulted with the Office of Government Ethics and
complied with all government requirements regarding her divestitures and holdings. Id.
6. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 877 (D. Md. 2018); Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
7. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow & Jonathan O’Connell, Trump’s Hotel Profits at Center of
Emoluments Clause Hearing, WASH. POST, June 12, 2018 at B4; Jonathan Stempel, Trump’s Lawyers
Say Trump SoHo Exit Undermines Emoluments Lawsuit, REUTERS NEWS (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lawsuit-emoluments/trumps-lawyers-say-trump-sohoexit-undermines-emoluments-lawsuit-idUSKBN1DO2FK
[https://perma.cc/98WS-32ZY];
Ann
POST,
(May
16,
2018),
Telnaes,
Emoluments,
Schmoluments,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/05/16/emoluments-schmoluments/
[https://perma.cc/SU5N-H7FZ].
8. See, e.g., Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman and the Judicial Education Project as Amici
Curiae In Support of the Defendant, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 2d 725 (D. Md. 2018)
(No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM) (arguing the Foreign Emoluments does not apply to elected positions such
as the presidency); Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments”
Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759 (2017) (disproving broad interpretations of constitutional
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continues to mount on the meaning of constitutional emoluments and modern
applications to alleged violations.9 These debates leave a gap in the literature
with respect to addressing the remedies question. The relevant constitutional
provisions state no remedies. Assume constitutional emoluments violations
exist, what are we going to do about it? This Article offers answers to that core
question and pathways to achieve desired goals of the underlying laws.
Putting aside the precise boundary on the impropriety of certain
emoluments, what is the proper remedy? Which remedy will achieve the
primary aims of the governing laws? This inquiry is vital for accountability of
this and future administrations. If our laws—especially constitutional ones—
lack bite, the temptation to engage in improper conduct, downplay arguable
conflicts, and cover up questionable behavior will rise. Where unjust
emoluments are proven, this Article explains why restitutionary disgorgement
is a well-suited remedy to serve the goals of unjust enrichment and anticorruption laws.
This Article introduces the constitutional boundaries for emoluments and
the Framers’ goals. Next, it summarizes the pending emoluments cases—all of
which fail to allege an unjust enrichment claim or remedy. In Part III, it situates
the disgorgement remedy within restitution law. This Article address
challenges, but ultimately promotes restitutionary disgorgement as a powerful
remedy to serve preferred goals. Part IV operationalizes potential paths for
pursuing the disgorgement remedy against government officials including a
statutory solution and a common law path. The Article concludes that
restitutionary disgorgement is the optimal remedy to deter corruption and selfdealing, as well as prevent unjust enrichment.

emoluments); John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal
Dictionaries,
1523–1806
(June
30,
2017),
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2995693
[https://perma.cc/XJ8R-CXAE] (refuting the administration’s narrow interpretation of emoluments
and correcting the historical record with an exhaustive definitional review); Norman Eisen, Richard
Painter & Laurence Tribe, The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and Application to Donald J.
Trump, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emoluments-clause-itstext-meaning-and-application-to-donald-j-trump/ [https://perma.cc/4E37-9D2N].
9. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2018) (“The faithfulness of a President to the Constitution,
the laws, and the ideals and traditions of the United States is at issue as never before . . . . Does the
Constitution have a plan for when it appears that a President may be motivated not by a view of the
public good but by self-regarding or bad faith purposes?”).
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II. EMOLUMENTS
A. Emoluments under the United States Constitution
What are emoluments? The English definition is “[a] salary, fee, or profit
from employment or office.”10 The French word “émolument” means benefit
or revenue.11 The Latin word “emolumentum” means advantage, benefit, gain,
or profit.12 A much more narrow interpretation is only profit from
employment.13 Sources contemporary with the Framers’ environment and then
public understanding14 provide support for broader interpretations such as any
gain.15 Regardless of the ultimate interpretative winner (scholarly or litigative)
10. Emolument,
ENGLISH
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES,
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/emolument [https://perma.cc/YK5D-YLNJ] (last visited Oct. 7,
2019).
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
11. Emolument,
ONLINE
https://www.etymonline.com/word/emolument [https://perma.cc/GM3V-CU8A] (last visited Oct. 7,
2019) (explaining partial roots of the term emolument derive “from Old French émolument ‘advantage,
gain, benefit; income, revenue’” in the 13th century).
12. Emolumentum, THE OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2012).
13. In pending litigation discussed infra Section II.C, President Trump has argued that
emolument means only “profit from labor.” Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35, District of Columbia
v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8.17-cv-1596-PJM), ECF No. 21-1. The President
advances the noscitur a sociis rule of construction for interpreting terms in written documents by
gleaning “meaning naturally attaching to them from their context.” District of Columbia v. Trump,
315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886–87, n.21 (D. Md. 2018) (citations omitted). In addition to the context, the
President relies on more narrow definitional examples defining emolument as profit from employ:
“profit, what is gained by labour,” “profit from an office or position,” “payment to a miller for grinding
corn.” Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35 n.28, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725
(D. Md. 2018), ECF No. 21-1 (citing Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English
Language 189 (1888), and The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 326 (1988)).
14. For advancement of a public-meaning conception of originalism for constitutional
interpretation, see for example Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of
Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–41 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller, eds. 2011), and
Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Account of Constitutional
Interpretation (Apr. 9, 2018) (“The Public Meaning Thesis is the claim that the original meaning of
the constitutional text is its public meaning: roughly, the meaning that the text had for competent
speakers of American English at the time each provision of the text was framed and ratified.”) (on file
with author).
15. To examine a helpful collection of historical resources on the Framers’ views on emoluments
and related goals tied to both Emoluments Clauses, explore 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 379–90
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987). This same collection is also available online: The
Founders Constitution, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/vol-3-theconstitution-part-2 [https://perma.cc/X34A-VDUV] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). Pending emoluments
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on the precise constitutional meaning of emoluments, this Article assumes that
certain emoluments may be lawful while others unlawful. In order for an
emolument to constitute an unjust benefit and warrant a disgorgement remedy,
receipt of a particular emolument must be improper under emoluments
prohibitions or other law.16
The United States Constitution prohibits federal government officials from
receiving emoluments from foreign states without congressional consent:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them,
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.17
This constitutional provision is known as the Emoluments Clause, the
Foreign Emoluments Clause, and also as the Title of Nobility Clause.18 The
United States Supreme Court has never interpreted the meaning of this clause.19
The Foreign Emoluments Clause and surrounding clauses say nothing about
what remedy might lie in the event a government official violates the clause.20
The United States Constitution also contains a Domestic Emoluments
Clause: “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that
Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”21
This clause applies explicitly to the President and bars the receipt of, during
the elected period, “any other emolument” from the United States or any state
litigation, discussed infra Section II.C., have included extensive briefing from the parties and amici
curiae on historical evidence on how to interpret the constitutional meaning of emoluments including
definitions stemming from dictionaries, THE FEDERALIST (infra Section II.B), and well-read authors
of the Framers’ day (infra Section II.B). One such court detailed the key evidence and sided with
broader conceptions such as any profit or gain over narrow definitions such as mere bribery. District
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“The clear weight of the evidence shows that an
‘emolument’ was commonly understood by the founding generation to encompass any ‘profit,’ ‘gain,’
or ‘advantage.’”).
16. See infra Part III.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
18. Legal Information Institute, Emoluments Clause, CORNELL LAW SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/emoluments_clause [https://perma.cc/5P94-DPUQ] (last updated
June 2017).
19. Disagreement exists about the reach of the clause, including whether it covers elected
officials. Also, the Articles of Confederation explicitly covered state government actors, while the
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
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within the United States.22 The Supreme Court has not interpreted the Domestic
Emoluments Clause.23
The Emoluments Clauses have several functions. One is to safeguard the
government official’s dedication and loyalty to aims of the country—to do the
government’s business rather than one’s own private business. A founding
view of republican virtues included a strong bias against self-dealing,24 though
the Founders often engaged in behavior that would violate conflicts of interest
under modern norms.25
Another purpose is the protection of national security. Directly related to
national security is the creation of constitutional boundaries that ensure against
public corruption.26 At the country’s founding, fears existed that our
government leaders would be susceptible to capture by foreign monarchs.27 For
example, if the President could accept emoluments from foreign leaders, the

22. Id.
23. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 161 (2d
Cir. 2019) (Walker, J., dissenting) (“Invoking constitutional provisions never directly litigated in the
230‐year history of our Republic prior to the Trump presidency, the plaintiffs in this case claim that
the President has inflicted competitive injury on their businesses by maintaining ownership over the
Trump Organization’s high‐end hotels and restaurants and accepting the business of foreign and state
official clientele in contravention of both the Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Domestic
Emoluments Clause.”); In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 373 (4th Cir. 2019) (“As the [Foreign and Domestic
Emoluments] Clauses do not expressly confer any rights or provide any remedies, efforts to enforce
them in courts have been virtually nonexistent prior to President Trump’s inauguration in 2017.”).
24. See, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133, 2140–41 (2017) (“Governmental self-dealing is a phenomenon
disfavored in constitutional law and jurisprudence. The generation that framed the Constitution,
steeped in republican tradition, developed a strong aversion to self-dealing—that is—the act of trading
on public prerogative for private gain.”) (citing, among others, NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE
PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 10 (2013); and
then citing ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX
TO CITIZEN’S UNITED 39 (2014)); see also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).
25. One prominent example is Chief Justice Marshall’s authoring the opinion in Marbury v.
Madison when he previously served as the government actor who failed to deliver the commissions at
issue. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 447–48 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority opinion for “disregard[ing] our
constitutional history and the fundamental demands of a democratic society” that show the important
governmental interest in preventing all manner of corruption not just limited to quid pro quo iterations
because “[c]orruption can take many forms . . . operat[ing] along a spectrum” from “selling a vote” to
“selling access” for the opportunity to influence).
27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009).
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Framers worried that foreign influences could buy favor, weaken the Executive,
and threaten the national security of the United States. Emoluments, therefore,
should not be accepted that would create an allegiance or curry favor on behalf
of certain states or countries over others. The interest in protecting national
security surpasses the more straight-forward, ethical goal of good government.
Other laws and ethical restrictions also govern improper gains including
using one’s public office for private gain.28 Such laws may bolster claims of
wrongdoing as they help maintain the public trust and avoid the appearance of
corruption. Ethical constraints may overlap with anti-corruption concerns. For
now, however, the Emoluments Clauses are the primary mode of substantive
attack in pending lawsuits against the Executive.
The current Executive’s failure to divest ownership interests in a company
with an international brand (among other alleged gains) has raised both Foreign
and Domestic Emoluments controversies.29 A debate exists as to the scope and
meaning of emoluments under both constitutional provisions.30 The vigorous
substantive and historical debate offers two basic poles: (i) a broad
interpretation and (ii) a narrow construction. This Article does not resolve the
constitutional interpretative debate. Whatever the scope of emoluments
28. See, e.g., The Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012) (prohibiting federal
employees, including the Executive, from accepting anything beyond de minimis gifts except as
explicitly provided); The Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2012) (prohibiting gifts to
federal employees); Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,
5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 (2010) (“An employee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, for
the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or
persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity, including nonprofit
organizations of which the employee is an officer or member, and persons with whom the employee
has or seeks employment or business relations.”) Of course, such regulations provide avenues of
institutional self-policing and sanctioning of bad actors. It remains unclear if such provisions offer a
viable avenue for court-based remedies. And, if so, by whom?
29. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018); Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
30. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Originalist Analysis About the Emoluments Clause from
President-Elect Trump’s Legal Team, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 11, 2017),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/01/11/the-originalist-analysis-about-the-emoluments-clausefrom-president-elect-trumps-legal-team/ [https://perma.cc/6F3Q-SK3Q]; Josh Blackman & Seth
Barrett Tillman, The Emoluments Clauses Litigation, Part 1: The Constitution’s Taxonomy of Officers
and Offices, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 25, 2017, 9:04 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/09/25/the-emoluments-clauseslitigation-part-1-the-constitutions-taxonomy-of-officers-and-offices/?utm_term=.19f68d41b822
[https://perma.cc/RHP8-VXE8]; Jed Shugerman, Is Trump Receiving “Office-Related” Emoluments?,
SHUGERBLOG (Feb. 25, 2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/02/25/is-trump-receiving-office-relatedemoluments/ [https://perma.cc/Q5YD-FN5C]; see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman & Gautham Rao,
Emoluments, Zones of Interests, and Political Questions: A Cautionary Tale, 45 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 651, 652–63 (2018).
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provisions, I argue that disgorgement is an appropriate and desirable remedy as
a judicial or legislative matter.
A few interpretative opinions offer insights into the possible scope of
emoluments. Most of the opinions establish what activities do not rise to the
level of unlawful emoluments.31 Through the decades, the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice has issued opinions suggesting its
interpretation of the scope of the Emoluments Clauses. Some of these opinions
clarify the OLC’s position that certain honors and monies do not constitute
unlawful emoluments.32 For example, a president’s receipt of the Nobel Prize
Award is not violative.33 Nor was another president’s receipt of state retirement
benefits as they did not subject him to improper influence.34 The OLC has not
publicly issued an opinion on the current emolument controversies.35 The
current President’s failure to divest has reinvigorated the debate about the scope
of the Emoluments Clauses and about the reach and relevance of the OLC’s
prior opinions.36 Regardless of the resolution of the fight on the merits,
disgorgement of gains should be on the short list of potent remedies if any
emoluments prove unlawful. Disgorgement will best serve the underlying
goals.
B. Goals of Anti-Emolument Laws
This Article does not resolve the constitutional battle over the precise
meaning of unlawful emoluments and whether any particular allegation fits that
definition. To discern ideal remedies, the goals behind anti-emolument laws
are more important than definitive boundaries of application. The Federalist
Papers contain at least fifteen instances of the word emolument. Some of the
31. See infra notes 34–37.
32. See infra notes 34–37.
33. Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the
President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009).
34. President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the State of California, 5
Op. O.L.C. 187 (1981).
35. A pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeks all O.L.C. opinions interpreting
the emoluments clause. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington FOIA Request to the
Office of Legal Counsel, (Dec. 22, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/storage.citizensforethics.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/02143023/2016-12-22-FOIA-Request-OLC-Memos-DomesticEmoluments-Clause.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y66G-A56B]. No results are posted.
36. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, How the DOJ Brief in CREW v. Trump Reveals that Donald
Trump is Violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 12, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/how-the-doj-brief-in-crew-v-trump-reveals-that-donald-trump-isviolating-the-foreign-emoluments-clause [https://perma.cc/XBW8-C43E?type=image].
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references appear to simply acknowledge that “emoluments will flow” from
governmental offices.37 At times, the word emolument connotes simple receipt
of payment38 or related benefit.39 At other times, the discussion seeks to ensure
the receipt of no “other emolument”40 or to prevent any increase in
emoluments.41
Framers’ discussions of emoluments were part of the overarching interest
in rejecting England’s monarchy system. For example, after quoting the
proposed text of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and comparing other
constitutional provisions and lack of provisions (such as Titles of Nobility) to
England’s foundation, Hamilton expressed the import of certain prohibitions
such as against titles of nobility to ensure protection of America’s republican
form of government “of the people.”42
More specifically, the Framers had concerns about government officials
engaging in self-dealing behavior.43 Self-dealing, in this context, arises when
government actors use their public offices to create and achieve advantages
furthering personal interests.44 It also includes using their government positions
to line their own pockets.45
Another goal of anti-emolument laws is simply that the government officers
should have undivided loyalty to the government.46 This ideal requires
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 27, at 265 (James Madison) (“From the gift
of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow.”).
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 27, at 320 (James Madison).
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 27, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The legislature, with
a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as
obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him.”).
40. Id. (“It is there provided that ‘The President of the United States shall, at stated times, receive
for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for
which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument
from the United States, or any of them.’”) (emphasis in original); id. at 421–22 (“Neither the Union,
nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any other
emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act.”).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 27, at 320–21 (“The members of the Congress are
rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be
increased, during the term of their election.”).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 27, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Nothing need be
said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated
the cornerstone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious
danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.”).
43. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2, 22, supra note 27, at 7, 120 (Alexander Hamilton).
44. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2, 22, supra note 27, at 7, 120 (Alexander Hamilton).
45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 27, at 47 (James Madison).
46. See S. Rep. 95-194, at 30 (1977); Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of
Government Employees by Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994).
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government actors to hold allegiance only to America.47 That loyalty may be
placed in jeopardy should the government officer receive favors and benefits
from foreign countries and their officials.
Anti-corruption is also a key sentiment for such prohibitions: “It was
thought proper, in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit
any one in office from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign
states.”48 A limit on receipt of emoluments operates to avoid one’s loyalty
being bought or clouded.49 Related to this interest is a desire to ensure the
government actor’s integrity remains intact and uncorrupted.50 Avoiding the
appearance of corruption is also important to maintaining public trust.
There are other remedial paths that could serve similar, desirable goals.
Remedies other than disgorgement, however, may go farther than preferred.
More importantly, they are more difficult to achieve than disgorgement. For
example, criminal sanctions could also serve anti-corruption and related goals,
but criminal sanctions would also address a more serious goal: punishing
offenders. Even if the Framers sought to punish those who violated antiemolument prohibitions, criminal penalties measurably raise the stakes. Any
criminal culpability would require mens rea, prosecutorial interest in pursuing,
and challenges including possible immunities. Unjust enrichment theory
generally requires lower levels of intentional behavior to reach unjustness.
Restitution does not punish. Disgorgement of improper gains is not punitive,
though it often exceeds compensatory loss. If one fears overapplication of
disgorgement as a bold remedy, Congress could tailor the intent to be higher.
Similarly, criminal law would default to a higher burden of proof (beyond a
reasonable doubt) than restitution law’s default of preponderance. Again,
though, if a restitution-based theory becomes statutory, the legislature could
adjust the required proof level to a clear and convincing standard or higher.
Another alternative remedial device is impeachment. Of course, the
requirements are constitutional and extremely high. Political momentum and
47. See S. Rep. 95-194, at 30 (1977) (The committee approved a series of more stringent rules
and procedures relating to the receipt of gifts, which demonstrates that the committee’s consciousness
of American loyalty and disapproval of the receipt of foreign gifts).
48. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale
University Press 1911) (statement of Governor Edmond Jennings Randolph).
49. Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government Employees by Foreign
Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994) (“Those who hold offices under the United States
must give the government their unclouded judgment and their uncompromised loyalty. That judgment
might be biased, and that loyalty divided, if they received financial benefits from a foreign
government.”).
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 27, at 421 (ensuring that a president’s integrity not be
weakened or corrupted by “appealing to his avarice”).
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proof would be paramount. Unlawful emoluments in some iterations could
include behavior that amounts to an impeachable offense, but daylight remains
for a range of emoluments that could be improper yet do not amount to
impeachable conduct. The House of Representatives would have to choose to
include in its impeachment inquiry possible emoluments violations. If the
House did so, and then the Senate later found that any such violations amounted
to an impeachable offense such as bribery, the consequence would be removal
from office. Still, such an inquiry could also lead to an interest in recovering
any ill-gotten gains on behalf of the United States government. Certain
potential emoluments may be unlawful, but not rise to the level of impeachable
offenses. Accordingly, it is important to have effective civil remedies,
including restitutionary disgorgement, to help enforce emoluments
prohibitions.
C. Pending Emoluments Litigation
Several emoluments-based lawsuits are pending against the President.
Each of the suits faces jurisdictional obstacles such as standing challenges; so
far, a couple have survived initial challenges and will advance to discovery. On
relief sought, the various emoluments complaints do not include unjust
enrichment or restitution as a claim or a remedy.51
1. The District of Columbia and Maryland
In one of the suits, the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia filed
a lawsuit claiming that President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments
Clause by accepting gifts and benefits from foreign entities seeking to curry
favor with the then-new administration.52 The plaintiffs also allege that foreign
leaders are more likely to stay at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C., and
that the affiliation with President Trump gives the hotel an unfair advantage
over other hotels who lose the business.53

51. Emoluments litigation should explicitly include unjust enrichment and restitution remedies.
Should courts vindicate plaintiffs’ claims as pleaded, however, restitutionary goals may be achieved
based on general prayers for equitable relief because an injunction could be framed to order divestment.
Again, though, the strategic advantage of pleading restitution is that it takes the focus away from
plaintiff’s proof of loss to defendant’s wrongful gain. A restitution and unjust enrichment count would
also broaden the emoluments inquiry to include fiduciary breaches and other wrongs.
52. Complaint at 41–42, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No.
8:17-cv-1596-PJM).
53. Id. at 40–42.
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The complaint fails to include any restitutionary theory or remedy.
Plaintiffs’ complaint requests declaratory, injunctive, and other relief as the
court deems just and proper.54
Despite serious challenges, the Maryland-District of Columbia suit
survived a motion to dismiss.55 The court ruled that plaintiffs stated actionable
claims upon which relief could be granted.56 Specifically, the court reasoned
that the plaintiffs established a proprietary harm satisfying “competitive
standing” by alleging that the purported wrongful transactions will “almost
surely” result in plaintiffs losing business.57 The court also articulated two
alternative theories supporting standing: parens patria (standing to protect the
economic interests of a state or district’s citizens) and quasi-sovereign interests
(competitive favoritism that disrupts the federal-state balance of power).58 On
other issues including individual immunity, the court deferred ruling.59 Based
upon more persuasive evidence on interpretations of emoluments, the court
determined that plaintiffs alleged viable constitutional violations against the
President in his official capacity under both emolument clauses.60 The court
denied the President’s motion to certify questions for appeal, and instead it
directed the parties to propose a schedule for civil discovery.61
The President in his official capacity then filed a writ of mandamus and
sought a stay. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
granted the stay pending consideration of the writ, granted oral argument with
two questions in addition to the procedural issues raised by the mandamus
request,62 and ultimately ruled in the President’s favor on the writ of
mandamus.63 The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
focusing on the lack of causation and redressability elements of constitutional
standing.64 Further, the court quickly rejected the alternative bases for standing
54. Id. at 44.
55. District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 757 (D. Md. 2018).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 744–45, 747.
58. Id. at 736–38.
59. Id. at 733 n.4.
60. Id. at 747, 757.
61. District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 844 (D. Md. 2018) (denying
interlocutory appeal and request for stay and requesting discovery schedule).
62. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 368 (4th Cir. 2019). Questions for oral argument included
whether either emoluments clause supports plaintiffs’ cause of action for injunctive relief and whether
plaintiffs allege a cognizable injury to satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Id.
63. Id. at 380.
64. Id. at 376.
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and noted that the suit amounted to no more than a constitutionally prohibited
generalized grievance.65 Maryland and the District of Columbia petitioned for
rehearing.66 The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing en banc.67
The two underlying opinions disagree completely on all facets of standing
analysis. Standing remains in dispute for each of the pending suits until, and
if, the Supreme Court decides to clarify what constitutes cognizable injury for
emoluments. Whether one sides with the lower or appellate court’s analysis on
the standing threshold, this is the moment to lay the foundation for a thoughtful
remedial approach for emoluments violations of the future.
2. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
Another is a lawsuit filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington (CREW).68 CREW alleges that President Trump’s businesses have
benefitted from him becoming president.69 For example, plaintiffs claim the
Trump Hotel in Washington D.C. is leased from the General Services
Administration, and membership fees at President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Resort
in Florida doubled from $100,000 to $200,000 after his election.70
The CREW litigation is more detailed in its prayer for relief, but it asks for
the same basic categories of remedies: declaratory, injunction, and other proper
relief.71 Again, it does not include an unjust enrichment claim or restitutionbased remedy.
A federal district judge in the Southern District of New York dismissed the
CREW litigation.72 The court reasoned that the action was not ripe for
adjudication.73 According to the judge, plaintiffs’ suit raises concern about a
conflict between two co-equal branches of government: Congress and the
65. Id. at 379.
66. Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 16–22, In re Trump, 2019 WL 5212216
(4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019) (No. 18-2486) (criticizing the court’s use of mandamus jurisdiction and arguing
that the court reconsider its ruling against quasi-sovereign standing and competitor standing, especially
in light of the Second Circuit’s ruling in favor of standing in an analogous matter).
67. District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 18-2488, 2019 WL 5212218 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019)
(order granting petition for rehearing en banc).
68. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v.
Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3, 34.
71. Id. at 64–65.
72. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188,
195 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (ruling that plaintiffs’ “alleged competitive injury” did not fall “within the zone
of interests that the Emoluments Clauses sought to protect” and therefore lacked constitutional standing
to proceed).
73. Id. at 195.
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President.74 As a matter of judicial restraint, the court reasoned that it “should
not interfere unless and until Congress has asserted its authority and taken some
sort of action with respect to [the President’s] alleged constitutional violations
of its consent power.”75 CREW’s appeal to the Second Circuit primarily argues
that plaintiffs satisfy Article III standing and overcome prudential barriers.76
The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, resuscitated the CREW litigation.77
The court found that plaintiffs satisfied standing requirements by alleging
sufficient injury including the competitive injury from lost patronage caused by
the President’s unfair advantage over the same customer base.78 This reasoning
creates a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling against standing in the
Maryland-District of Columbia litigation.79 Whether the Second Circuit’s
favorable standing determination remains intact will be up to the Supreme
Court should the Court opt to consider resolving the justiciability issues in the
emoluments context once the cases are ripe.80
3. Democratic Legislators
A third lawsuit includes 201 Democratic legislators who assert that the
Constitution mandates that Congress should have been consulted on whether
the President may accept foreign payments to his company, the Trump
Organization.81 The primary allegation in the complaint is that the President
accepted emoluments without first obtaining congressional assent.82
As to remedies sought, again no restitution. The Democratic legislators’
suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the catchall for further
relief as the court deems just.83

74. Id. at 194.
75. Id. at 194–95. “Congress is not a potted plant. It is a co-equal branch of the federal
government with the power to act as a body in response to Defendant’s alleged Foreign Emoluments
Clause violations, if it chooses to do so.” Id. at 195 n.8.
76. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v.
Trump, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-474).
77. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 939 F.3d at 131.
78. Id. at 143–44.
79. See id. at *9 (noting the creation of a circuit split); supra Section II.C.1.
80. See Andy Grewal, The Second Circuit’s Botched “Zone of Interests” Analysis in CREW v.
Trump, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 14, 2019), https://yalejreg.com/nc/thesecond-circuits-botched-zone-of-interests-analysis-in-crew-v-trump/ [https://perma.cc/3NH7-7B4K].
81. Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2018).
82. Id. at 50.
83. Complaint at 53–54, Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (1:17-cv-01154-EGS).
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Much like the CREW litigation, the Democratic lawmakers’ Foreign
Emoluments suit faced formidable standing problems.84 The legislators,
however, survived the standing challenge for now.85 The court limited its ruling
to only the standing threshold.86 The legislators alleged the President violated
the Foreign Emoluments Clause by accepting “prohibited foreign emoluments
without seeking the consent of Congress.”87 Plaintiffs maintained that each
plaintiff suffered a concrete, particularized injury. United States District Court
Judge Emmet Sullivan ruled that 201 minority legislators (Senators and
Representatives) demonstrated sufficient injury to satisfy Article III standing
requirements.88 The judge reasoned that the legislators alleged concrete injuries
sufficient to satisfy standing.89
According to the court, Plaintiffs satisfied the standing hurdle by alleging
denial of a voting opportunity that constituted a cognizable actual injury caused
by defendant and redressable by a favorable court opinion notwithstanding
separation-of-powers constraints.90 The court justified its standing holding
despite the separation-of-powers tension on the basis that “plaintiffs have no
adequate legislative remedy,” but instead the matter is resolvable in the courts.91
The court’s opinion greatly relied on amici briefs to support a broad
interpretation of emoluments as a powerful guard against corruption and
foreign influence.92 Per the amici’s evidence, the court noted that presidents
historically have sought OLC advice before accepting possible emoluments.93
Further, because the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause explicitly
prohibits presidential acceptance of unlawful foreign emoluments, “the
Constitution gives each individual Member of Congress a right to vote before
84. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. at 52–57 (relying heavily on Court’s standing analysis in Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)). In Raines, individual members of Congress were found to lack standing
because they did not have “sufficient personal stake in [the] dispute and [did] not allege[] a sufficiently
concrete injury” because the members of Congress “alleged no injury to themselves as individuals . . . ,
the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed . . . , and their attempt to
litigate this dispute at this time is contrary to historical experience.” Id. at 57 (quoting Raines, 521
U.S. at 829–30).
85. Id. at 72.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 50.
88. Id. at 49–50, 72. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that they suffer particularized injury “when
his or her vote is nullified by the President’s denial of the opportunity to vote on the record about
whether to approve his acceptance of a prohibited foreign emolument.” Id. at 50.
89. Id. at 50–51, 64–65.
90. Id. at 54, 64–65.
91. Id. at 54–55.
92. Id. at 51 n.2 (“The Court appreciates the illuminating analysis provided by the amici.”).
93. Id. at 53–54.
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the President accepts.”94 All of this set the backdrop for the court to find that
plaintiffs possessed standing under Article III to protect against foreign
corruption of the Executive.
With the legislators surviving the initial standing threshold, discovery
ordinarily would commence. As with all the pending suits, however, the
government is advancing substantial arguments for stays pending an expedited
appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
remanded the matter back to the district court for consideration of unexplored
separation-of-powers issues.95 Given the directive, Judge Sullivan put a hold
on thirty-seven subpoenas previously issued to obtain the President’s financial
and business records. Judge Sullivan has requested new briefing from both
parties. The Department of Justice persists in its efforts seeking the federal
appellate court reverse the favorable standing ruling.
The Democratic legislators’ case poses the strongest case for standing, yet
it is not without critique given the novelty and magnitude of the allegations as
well as the political stage. Again, regardless of the standing fight, it is an ideal
time to consider both the scope of unlawful emoluments and the proper remedy
for future emoluments violations by any administration.
D. Restitution Road
Restitution should be a part of litigation strategy and any regulatory reform
for emoluments violations. For the pending litigation that has so far survived,
the standing rulings remain subject to appeal. Formidable challenges on appeal
include ripeness and separation-of-powers concerns. The standing rulings
remain vulnerable because much hinges on the interpretation of emoluments
and the cognizability of injuries as alleged. Also, the remedies sought may pose
roadblocks during the course of litigation. For example, even assuming
standing, serious issues may arise regarding whether plaintiffs can satisfy
equitable requirements for the remedies sought.96 These remedies will
encounter other challenges. For example, the President argues that the
94. Id. at 54.
95. In re Trump, 2019 WL 3285234, *2 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 2019) (No. 19-5198) (order of
remand) (“The district court did not adequately address whether—given the separation of powers issues
present in a lawsuit brought by members of the Legislative Branch against the President of the United
States—resolving the legal questions and/or postponing discovery would be preferable, or whether
discovery is even necessary (or more limited discovery would suffice) to establish whether there is an
entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief of the type sought by plaintiffs.”).
96. Equitable requirements include formidable proof obstacles such as proving legal remedies
are inadequate.
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injunctive remedy sought by the 201 legislators is unconstitutional.97 Assuming
injunctive relief is constitutional, such an in personam order is intrusive by
nature and poses separation-of-powers concerns that restitution awards do not.
Restitution-based remedies also avoid challenges rooted in a plaintiff’s
inability to demonstrate compensatory loss as well as other classic hurdles.98
Again, restitution remedies including disgorgement are gain-based. The
remedy looks to what defendant has gained unjustly. For this simple reason,
restitution is an advantageous alternative frame for plaintiffs attempting to
show cognizable injury. Still, constitutional standing requires more than a
generalized grievance—citizens cannot simply claim a government official has
violated a statute or constitutional provision.99 Under a restitutionary theory,
plaintiff would need to show a causal link to the government actor’s wrongful
gain or otherwise satisfy the constitutional minimum of standing as a statutorily
created whistleblower status with sufficient nexus to the harm.
III. THE DISGORGEMENT REMEDY
A. Disgorgement Remedy Shaping Rights
Determining who has a right matters less than how we choose to protect
that right to serve our desired goals.100 Substantive rights shape remedies, and
remedies in turn shape rights.101 The latter is especially true when there are
97. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50 n.1.
98. See, e.g., Wright v. Genessee County, No. 156579, 2019 WL 3242418 (Mich. July 18, 2019)
(ruling that unjust enrichment for which one seeks restitution rather than compensatory damages is an
freestanding cause of action—independent of tort and contract—and overcomes governmental tort
immunity).
99. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992); see also F. Andrew Hessick,
Quasi-Sovereign Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1926, 1927–28 (2019) (exploring state versus
individual standing and noting the state’s interest in defending the public interest). For a call to
reconsider Lujan’s reasoning based on the underexamined Anglo-American legal history of qui tam
legislation that authorized private informers to monitor and collect litigation bounties for unlawful acts
of executive officials, see Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials:
Constitutional Implications of a Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (2018).
100. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 859 (1999) (“[D]eciding who has a right (or, in Cathedral terms, an ‘entitlement’) is often less
important than deciding how that right should be protected in order to best facilitate efficient
transfers.”).
101. My body of work and planned manuscript echo and further articulate this theme. See id. at
858 (advancing a public law correlation—inextricable intertwinement—between remedy and right);
see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (theorizing a correlation between private
law rights and remedies); John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies,
and Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849 (2015) (explaining the historical relationship between federal
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intersections or gaps in the law. Remedies like disgorgement—stripping
defendant’s wrongful profits—help serve previously unmet or underserviced
goals of the law. Of course, a remedy should not flow where no right exists.
There must be a sufficient foundation and a need for the remedy to reach the
offensive conduct that will otherwise go undeterred.
A modern example in American law is opportunistic breaches of
contract.102 Conventional breach of contract remedies, such as expectancy and
reliance damages, did not capture the wrongfulness. Restitution concepts
enable a plaintiff, in rare cases of proven opportunism, to strip defendant’s
wrongful gain. Aside from specific performance, conventional contract law
monetary remedies serve only a compensation function. For rare breaches that
are opportunistic, compensation does not suffice. The law of unjust enrichment
stepped in to fill the gap between contract and tort law103 by disgorging
defendant’s unjust gain from a deliberate, profitable breach in which defendant
took conscious advantage of plaintiff’s insufficient ability to achieve substitute
performance. American cases underlying the remedy did not use proper
labels104 but achieved the same result on grounds captured by the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.105
1. Historical Roots and Development of the Disgorgement Remedy
Disgorgement of improper gains is a remedy much broader and more
storied than an opportunistic breach of contract claim. It seeks to undo unjust
gain and deter wrongfulness. Restitutionary-based disgorgement serves as a
remedy across a host of underlying causes of action from common law

cause of action and rights, remedies, and jurisdiction, and finding closeness only to remedies). But see
Jules Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986)
(lamenting the conflation between private rights and remedies).
102. I have written much in this area. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement
as a Moral Compass of Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991 (2009); Caprice L. Roberts, A
Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 945 (2008); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach
of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131 (2008).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d. (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (operationalizing disgorgement as the remedy for opportunistic breaches of contract).
104. Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977) (stripping defendant’s
profits in breach of contract action, though not using the label disgorgement); see also Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (imposing a constructive trust on book royalties where defendant
failed to obtain prepublication clearance).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, pt. II, ch. 4,
introductory note & reporter’s note a.
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examples like breach of fiduciary duty106 to statutory examples like federal
securities law violations.107 It has historical roots in equity.108 But, it is a
mistake to assume disgorgement is always equitable because of its historical
ties. Specifically, it is tied to the equitable remedy of accounting for profits109
through which the Chancellor110 would order defendant to deliver accounting
books to an equitable master to unearth sources of potential wrongful profits.111
The Chancellor no longer operates in this realm;112 instead a judge uses
discretion to permit and shape an equitable accounting. The modern
disgorgement remedy may stem from a common law or statutory claim and may
not have any identifiable association with an equitable accounting. Again,

106. See Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW
449, 449 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) [hereinafter Bray, Fiduciary
Remedies] (analyzing fiduciary law remedies including accounting for profits, disgorgement, and
constructive trusts to discern if a distinct body of law emerges based on the remedial goals sought);
see also Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications for
Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463 (exploring historical support for
fiduciary constitutionalism and advancing remedies for public fiducial breaches).
107. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017) (explaining that courts have ordered
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions since the 1970’s upon the SEC’s requests for the grant of
disgorgement as part of the court’s “inherent equity power” ancillary to injunctive relief and that the
SEC continued to request disgorgement even after 1990’s legislation explicitly authorized civil
monetary penalties). Such instances may well run contrary to conventional restitution doctrine due to
legislative design. Such a legislative creature may present a distinct type of disgorgement that is more
akin to a penalty; where classic restitution remedies are neither penalties nor designed to be punitive.
108. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, supra note 106, at 449; Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary
Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 63 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul
B. Miller eds., 2014).
109. DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION § 4.3(5). (3d ed. 2018) (tracing the development of the common law accounting for profit
to equity and also then the modern connection to unjust enrichment and development of a disgorgement
remedy); see also Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417, 482 (2017) [hereinafter Bray, Multiple Chancellors] (“A medieval Chancellor
spoke on behalf of God and King; an early modern Chancellor spoke on behalf of conscience and
King.”).
110. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at 58–63 (summarizing the history of the Chancery
Court and its Chancellor, who began in the medieval sense as “high minister of the king,” turned novel
writ maker, and ultimately turned judge of an equity court).
111. See id. at 415–16 (“Regular officers of the Chancery Court, the masters, could serve as
auditors and work through complex accounts if necessary and report to the court. Chancery could use
its powers of discovery to find hidden assets in the hands of defendant, and altogether the chancery
accounting worked out pretty well.”).
112. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 109, at 420 (explaining how the Chancellor’s
authority is now dispersed to every judge that has the authority to issue equitable relief).
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disgorgement may constitute a legal or equitable remedy depending on the
circumstances.113
Disgorgement operates in both public and private law contexts.114 A classic
basis for wrongfulness is a fiduciary breach. Wrongfulness may arise, however,
from the presence of an enrichment that is unjust.115 Any benefit is unjust if the
recipient has no right to retain it or in good conscience ought to pay value for
it.116 In this way, restitution turns the focus away from plaintiff’s loss to
defendant’s wrongful gain.117 Accordingly, restitution-based remedies often
exceed compensation.118 Punishment, however, is not the aim of restitution:
“The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing
while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.”119 Instead, the
aim is to undo defendant’s unjust enrichment. Thus, where defendant unjustly
profits, restitution remedies operate to strip the profit that is wrongful.
Restitutionary remedies that achieve this goal are most commonly referred to

113. See infra Section III.A.2. For a useful discussion of the complexity of jury trial rights
regarding accounting and disgorgement remedies, see generally Doug Rendleman, Commercial
Bribery: Choice and Measurement Within a Remedies Smorgasbord, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369
(2017).
114. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1059 (2015) (public: affirming $1.8 million
disgorgement award for opportunistic breach of an interstate compact agreement over allocation of
water rights); Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–95 (Colo. App. 2011) (private: ruling
proper a disgorgement of net profits award in real estate transaction case); Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co.,
136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 678, 678 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (private: determining that plaintiff had stated a
restitution claim for opportunistic breach of contract to disgorge benefits).
115. Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 930 (2012)
(“The law of restitution and unjust enrichment creates distinctive causes of action with many and
diverse applications—to mistake, to joint owners and joint obligors, to unenforceable contracts, to
disrupted transactions of all kinds. And it creates distinctive remedies with applications to all sorts of
causes of action—to claims in contract, tort, and unjust enrichment, and to claims for equitable wrongs
and for violation of statutes.”).
116. Unjust enrichment could be properly characterized as “unjustified enrichment”—
“enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (grounding unjust enrichment law on legal, rather than
moral, bounds); see also Laycock, supra note 115, at 932.
117. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279
(1989).
118. E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle
in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341, 1392 (1985) (opposing a disgorgement of defendant’s
gains for contract law based on the core purpose of contract law remedies to compensate plaintiff for
loss).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4); see also
DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at § 4.3(5).
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as an accounting or disgorgement.120 In this context, disgorgement is a givingup rather than a giving-back form of restitution, and plaintiff’s “at-the-expenseof” loss is not required.121
Disgorgement is technically not a proprietary remedy.122 A proprietary
remedy yields a property right such as title to a particular asset.123
Disgorgement of gains as a remedy does not, by itself, create a right to title in
property. It is often linked to an accounting for profits, which is also not
propriety.124 Rather, disgorgement targets defendant’s monetary gains. If the
court orders a defendant to deliver financial books to discern profits and losses,
the remedy appears to operate in personam—on defendant.125 If, instead, the
court or jury awards a monetary remedy in an amount that equals defendant’s
net gains, the remedy appears to operate in rem—on property.126
Disgorgement may be confused with the proprietary remedy of constructive
trust for unjust enrichment or fiduciary breach. A constructive trust specifically
operates in personam, but the effect is in rem in that the order once performed
results in the transfer of title to property based on defendant’s unjust enrichment
that began with plaintiff. Each of these remedies relates to one another, but
they are distinct in how they operate. The constructive trust is equitable,
requires tracing, and orders defendant to place the title of the trust property (the
trust res) in the name of the true equitable owner, plaintiff. An accounting for
profits is also equitable127 and orders defendant to provide an account of profits
to plaintiff. Disgorgement awards plaintiff defendant’s wrongful gain.

120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (“Restitution
remedies that pursue this object are often called ‘disgorgement’ or ‘accounting.’”). See also DOBBS &
ROBERTS, supra 109, at § 4.3(5) (discussing the same).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51.
122. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, supra note 106, at 454.
123. Id. at 455.
124. See generally KATY BARNETT, ACCOUNTING FOR PROFIT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2012) (interchanging an award of an account of profits with “disgorgement
damages” and calling for adoption of equitable barriers to disgorgement awards for certain contractual
breaches).
125. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at 397 (“Equity’s theory was that it did not decide title
but acted in personam. It did not act on title or property but upon the person of defendant, compelling
him to follow good conscience rather than good title.”).
126. Id. § 1.4 (explaining how money judgments “at law” are enforced “in rem, that is against
things or property, not against persons”).
127. Though the history is more complicated, an accounting is generally presumed equitable.
Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); GEORGE E. PALMER, 1 THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION § 1.5(c) (1978); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES AND
MATERIALS 440 (2018) (discussing mischaracterizations of an accounting for profit as legal and
connection to application of statute of limitations versus laches considerations).
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2. The Import of the Law-Equity Classification on Constitutional Rights and
Defenses
Simple classification of the disgorgement remedy as either equitable or
legal is complex. The law-equity distinction matters because it affects related
rights. Equity has distinct features that create a body of law,128 and equity also
has its own defenses.129 For example, if disgorgement is categorized as a
remedy at law, it triggers federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial.130
If instead the remedy is deemed equitable, the determination of whether and
how to calculate a disgorgement award rests solely with the judge.131 Further,
as part of equitable discretion, the judge might deny an equitable remedy if a
plaintiff comes to the court with unclean hands. Federal legislation could
extend a jury trial right even if disgorgement were truly equitable, but it cannot
(without a constitutional amendment) strip a right to a jury if the constitutional
right applies.
Historically, the law-equity divide corresponded to the distinction between
law’s goal of compensation and restitution’s sole focus on defendant’s
wrongful gain:
[T]he law estimates the damage done to the plaintiff by the
defendant’s wrongful act and gives judgment for damages
sufficient to compensate him. Equity, on the other hand, does
not concern itself with the damage done to the plaintiff: it
concerns itself solely with the profits made by the defendant
through his wrongdoing. These it holds he cannot in
conscience retain; and so it orders him to deliver them up to
the plaintiff even when the plaintiff has suffered no actual
damages through the wrong. This is the principle upon which

128. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 533 (2016)
[hereinafter Bray, Equitable Remedies] (maintaining that equity constitutes its own system and one
that is usefulness in modern law).
129. Two common equitable defenses are unclean hands and laches. The judge will use unclean
hands to deny an equitable remedy where the movant engaged in misconduct directly related to the
underlying case. Laches serves to thwart an action for equitable relief where plaintiff slept on its rights
by unreasonably delaying the litigation and prejudicing defendant. Id. at 581.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”).
131. Bray, Equitable Remedies, supra note 128, at 545.
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the remedy by account is based.132
Still, classification of disgorgement remains unresolved in American law.
Further, litigant characterization is not dispositive.133 Misclassifications and
myths regarding the general topic of unjust enrichment and restitution
abound.134 Judicial and scholarly treatment of the disgorgement remedy is
inconsistent.135 Most determinations favor an equitable framing, but recent
Supreme Court interpretations favor legal classification without resolving
constitutional jury trial rights.136 Courts have treated disgorgement as equitable
in many contexts,137 but also as a remedy at law garnering a constitutional right
to a jury.138

132. J.A. STRAHAN, A DIGEST OF EQUITY 418–19 (5th ed. 1928) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
133. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476–79 (1962). In Dairy Queen, plaintiff’s
complaint alleged breach of a licensing agreement covering a trademark. Id. at 473. Plaintiff sought
an injunction and an accounting of profits; plaintiff asserted the “purely equitable” nature of the
remedies it sought. Id. at 477. The Court declined the invitation to allow plaintiff’s “choice of words
used in the pleadings” to dictate proper classification: “the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot
be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings.” Id. at 477–78. Rather, the Court
noted that “[a] jury, under proper instructions from the court, could readily determine the recovery, if
any, to be had here, whether the theory finally settled upon is that of breach of contract, that of
trademark infringement, or any combination of the two.” Id. at 479. It further reasoned that legal
damages would not be inadequate simply because measuring such damages might require obtaining
and examining defendant’s business records. Id.
134. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 127, 539–46.
135. For confusing aspects of disgorgement, see Bert I. Huang, The Equipoise Effect, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1598 (2016) (“Our usual rhetoric hides [the equipoise effect of disgorgement]
because the way we speak about disgorgement often conflates the remedy itself with the trappings of
its usage, implicitly piling on extra nonremedial costs.”).
136. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 2001);
Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1986); George P. Roach, A Default
Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies,
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 48 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015) (disgorgement as remedy for
Nebraska’s opportunistic breach of the Republican River Compact); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc.,
438 F.3d 1052, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 2006) (disgorgement as equitable remedy for FDCA violation);
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Restitution for the disgorgement
of unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy with no right to a trial by jury.”); Castrol, 169 F. Supp. 2d
at 344 (disgorgement as equitable under the Lanham Act); Am. Cyanamid, 649 F. Supp. at 789 (denying
constitutional right to jury trial distinguishing disgorgement as equitable in nature and reasoning that
“a claim for profits seeks relief recognized by the Seventh Amendment as fundamentally different from
a claim for damages, the cases relied upon by American Cyanamid—involving claims for both
damages and unjust profits—cannot be interpreted as blurring the two claims and rendering legal an
otherwise purely equitable claim for profits”).
138. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Disgorgement is another form
of restitution, as Judge Friendly noted . . . , and restitution, as we have noted in several non-SEC cases,
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Classification of disgorgement as legal instead of equitable is contested and
important. Resolution of the law-equity issue implicates constitutional jury trial
rights as well as other meaningful issues such as the available defenses. Though
many courts view, if not assume, disgorgement as equitable, the United States
Supreme Court has muddied the waters in two recent cases—both of which lean
toward legal classification. Could this be another “accidental revolution”139 for
remedies law on the Court’s part?
The first case does not consider the constitutional right to a jury trial.
Rather, the case raised a statute of limitations question. In Kokesh v. SEC, the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that disgorgement in the context of a
securities-enforcement action is a legal “penalty” rather than an equitable
remedy, and as such, would be subject to the five-year statute of limitations
under the Securities Exchange Act.140 The Court expressed that the ruling was
for the narrow question at issue.141
A federal district court subsequently noted that the Kokesh ruling did not
determine the law-equity classification as a matter of constitutional analysis but
rather only as to the statute of limitations.142 After conducting historical
analysis, the federal district court ruled that disgorgement is equitable and
denied any constitutional right to a jury trial.143
The law-equity distinction surrounding the disgorgement remedy also arose
in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.,144 a case involving a design-patent
is both a legal and an equitable remedy.”); Roach, supra note 136, at 48 (maintaining disgorgement
may be either equitable or legal); cf. ROBERT M. LANGER, JOHN T. MORGAN, & DAVID L. BELT,
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, BUSINESS TORTS, AND
ANTITRUST § 6.9 (2019–2020 ed.) (noting disgorgement’s classification is complex). For reasoning
on the right to a jury trial for legal restitution generally, see First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203
S.W.3d 88, 92–94 (Ark. 2005).
139. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 203 (2012) (arguing that
the Court’s modern injunction holdings caused an “accidental revolution”).
140. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639, 1645 (2017) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2462).
141. Id. Notably, the Supreme Court leaves open the question of judicial power to order
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions: “Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion
on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on
whether courts have properly applied disgorgement principles in this context. The sole question
presented in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement actions, is subject
to § 2462’s limitations period.” Id. at 1642 n.3.
142. United States v. Rapower–3, LLC, 294 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1241–42 (D. Utah 2018).
143. Id. at 1241 (denying right to jury trial on the basis of long-standing precedent categorizing
disgorgement as equitable remedy incidental to injunctive relief).
144. 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
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infringement claim under the Patent Act.145 The Solicitor General argued that
a jury should determine the article of manufacture and the amount of any
disgorged profits and that the defendant should bear the burden of proof. This
high-stakes litigation centered much attention on the remedies provision of the
statute authorizing a disgorgement award for the design-patent infringer’s “total
profit.”146 The Court analyzed whether to measure the disgorgement award
based on Samsung’s profits for its smartphone devices as a whole versus only
profits associated with individual components.147 The Supreme Court adopted
a component-level interpretation advanced by the infringer Samsung because
components are “articles of manufacture” (even if not sold separately to
consumers), but that the whole device is also an “article of manufacture.”148
Citing the lack of “adequate briefing by the parties,”149 the Court failed to
resolve the proper measure for a judge or a jury to use. Instead, the Court left
the issue for resolution by the Federal Circuit. Patent law scholars have raised
concerns over the Supreme Court’s holding and the merits of the Solicitor
General’s contentions regarding the classification of the remedy as legal.150
Other patent law scholars wholly objected to the application of an all-profitsdisgorgement remedy as absurd and draconian.151
If common-law based cause of action seeks a disgorgement remedy, then
the law-equity classification of disgorgement is an open question in some
circumstances and clearer in others. For example, if the underlying claim is for
breach of fiduciary duty, the claim is equitable and often the remedies sought
145. Id.
146. Id. at 431 (examining 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012)).
147. Id. A cell phone screen is an example of a component.
148. Id. at 436 (“[T]he term ‘article of manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product
sold to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or not. Thus, reading
‘article of manufacture’ in § 289 to cover only an end product sold to a consumer gives too narrow a
meaning to the phrase.”).
149. Id. (“We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the § 289 damages inquiry in the
absence of adequate briefing by the parties.”).
150. See Pamela Samuelson & Mark Gergen, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design Patent Law,
108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (exploring the proper scope of the disgorgement remedy in
design patent law). A historical survey of pre-statute claims for infringers’ profits, including patent
and copyright claims, would likely reveal a mixture of approaches including some courts treating the
remedy as legal. Such results, if demonstrated, would complicate efforts to convince the Supreme
Court to deem the modern remedy equitable as a matter of constitutional interpretation unless the Court
shifts its test for resolving the law-equity issue away from the historical focus.
151. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petition for
Certiorari at 2, 9, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777). Others also
opposed an all-profit disgorgement award and noted such negatives as the major ramifications on the
patent industry. Brief of Systems, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Samsung Elecs.
Co., 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777).
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are identifiably equitable such as a constructive trust or an injunction. But,
however, what if the cause of action is legal but the remedy is equitable?
Confusion abounds because some courts in fiduciary breach cases claim to
award “damages” or abandon the equitable accounting of profits frame for the
term disgorgement.152 If, instead, the claim is opportunistic breach of contract
seeking disgorgement, the issue is an open question.153 Recall that restitution
remedies can be equitable (constructive trust) or legal (quantum meruit or
quantum valebant).154 Courts have granted constitutional jury trial rights in
cases seeking restitution-based remedies under the frames of quasi-contract,
legal restitution, and freestanding unjust enrichment for quantum meruit or
quantum valebant.155 Further, when analyzing the Seventh Amendment
constitutional right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court has conducted separate
analysis of both the claim and the remedy sought with modern jurisprudence
focusing on the history rather than the function of the remedy.156 If one party
requests a jury trial, and the other opposes it, the court would likely focus on
historical analysis of the claim and the remedy to make the determination.157 If,
as this Article suggests, Congress passes legislation authorizing litigation and
providing for disgorgement relief, Congress would be free to extend a right to
a jury trial regardless of classification because the constitutional right is a floor
rather than a ceiling. It is more likely that Congress would be silent,158 which
would leave the jury trial question to the courts.
152. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, supra note 106, at 465.
153. For indications of the complexity, a draft version of the Restatement noted that it would be
a serious mistake to treat the new disgorgement for opportunistic breach section as equitable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 7, 2010). The final version of the Restatement, however, is silent on the proper
classification. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 4 cmt. e.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4.
155. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2002) (restitution as both a legal
and equitable remedy); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (restitution
of disgorgement of unjust enrichment as equitable remedy); First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203
S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ark. 2005) (unjust enrichment after alleged breach of implied contract as equitable
cause of action).
156. Samuel L. Bray, Equity and the Seventh Amendment (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No.
1852, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237907 [https://perma.cc/H9V6-PFKA].
157. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 351–53 (1998)
(analyzing whether the claim and the remedy were historically treated as legal or equitable); Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376–84 (1996) (analyzing whether patent claim
construction was historically a matter for the judge or jury).
158. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (D.N.J. 2001)
(“A plain reading of the Lanham Act remedy section unqualifiedly weighs against Pennzoil’s
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An equitable frame would be best because judges rather than juries could
shape the relief while balancing the delicate interests at stake in suits leveled
against sitting government officials. For example, constitutional or federal
statute violations may lead to equitable relief along with ancillary remedies
against government officials despite claims of sovereign immunity.159
Equitable relief is prospective and, if in the form of disgorgement rather than
injunctive relief, is less disruptive to delicate separation-of-powers and
federalism balances. Such suits are grounded on civil rights legislation that
expressly authorizes suing state government actors.160 The Emoluments
lawsuits generally rest on a theory of the Executive’s official conduct violating
the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution. These lawsuits are not based on
civil rights violations, so the traditional, express pathway to federal court
litigation is lacking.161 Advocates of the Emoluments litigation maintain that
an implied right of action exists, but this point is vigorously contested.162
Explicit statutory authorization, as proposed below, would alleviate much of
this tension.

interpretation that they are entitled to a jury trial on the disgorgement of profits issue. . . . Furthermore,
the language of this section makes no mention of a trial by jury.”).
159. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 697–99 (1978) (attorney fees); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 162–63 (1908) (injunctive relief).
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
161. See Josh Blackman & Seth Tillman, The Emoluments Clauses Litigation, Part 8: There is
No Cause of Action for a Suit Against the President in his Individual Capacity for Purported Violations
of the Emoluments Clauses, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 8, 2018, 3:04 PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/02/08/the-emoluments-clauses-litigation-part-8
[https://perma.cc/5RDT-MXTM].
162. Id.
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B. Disgorgement as the Proper Remedy for Emoluments Violations
If a federal officer receives an emolument that is unconstitutional, it is by
definition an unjust benefit. Disgorgement is particularly suited to remedy that
wrong.163 It centers on defendant’s wrongful gain rather than plaintiff’s loss.
Ideally, disgorgement harmonizes the imbalance of gain by depriving the
wrongdoer of profits to the point of lawfulness. However, if the gains are given
to one who should have been entitled to make them, then the court restores a
just equilibrium.164
But, who should have the right to remedy this wrong? Should the remedy
be attainable by private plaintiffs or the government treasury itself? An analogy
to the cy près doctrine—allowing the judge to discern as near as possible in
whom the remedy should lie—from charitable trust law might be a helpful path
for determining a worthy recipient.165 Depending upon the category of
emoluments, not all of the potential plaintiffs in the pending cases have a right
to make the profits. A competing hotel may have that right and thus rerouting
the gain to such plaintiffs attains proper equilibrium between wrongdoer and
victim. If the theory of litigation is on behalf of the government or the people,
placing the gain in the government’s hands is more of a distributive choice than
a rebalancing or a restoration. It would not be a restoration because the gain
does not constitute money previously belonging to, or expected to be gained
by, the plaintiff. Again, though disgorgement serves to force defendant to give
up wrongful gain, it does not require that the money first resided in the
plaintiff’s possession or potential possession.166 But power to recover such
gains and deter corruption should lie in the government because the gain is
achieved by virtue of the official’s government position.167
163. If a court authorizes a disgorgement remedy, it may be necessary to reach the government
officer’s personal account where such assets may lie. For an argument that any disgorgement or
constructive trust remedy in the emolument context necessitates suing the President in his personal
rather than official capacity, see Motion for Leave to File Brief of Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman and
Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party with Respect to Motion to
Dismiss on Behalf of Defendant in His Individual Capacity at 14–15, District of Columbia v. Trump,
291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM).
164. As discussed below, infra note 208 and accompanying text, Aristotle would be pleased with
this use of restitution to restore justice.
165. I.R.S., The Cy Pres Doctrine: State Law and the Dissolution of Charities (1981),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopice81.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CXK-DDX6].
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
167. I.R.S., supra note 165; see Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1955) (endorsing
city’s implied power to sue for restitution to recover money that officials allegedly extorted from city
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The Supreme Court recently endorsed a disgorgement remedy for
opportunistic breach of contract in an interstate water-compact case.168 Though
the setting is distinct, the underlying logic is relevant in the potential use of a
disgorgement remedy against a federal officer. The Court noted: “And
whatever is true of a private contract action, the case for disgorgement becomes
still stronger when one State gambles with another State’s rights to a scarce
natural resource.”169 Endorsing the remedy of disgorgement, the Court sought
to serve at least two goals: stability and deterrence.170 The stability interest
included the law of contracts as well as the allocation of water resources under
such compacts.171
Emoluments raise a strong deterrence interest as well as a desire for
stability. Addressing an emoluments violation is not as simple as remedying a
breach of contract. But if an emolument is deemed unlawful, it is a breach of
trust. If foreign governments are attempting to curry favor, disgorgement
would restabilize proper relations and demonstrate the wrongfulness of the
attempt.
The fact that disgorgement often exceeds compensation is more
troublesome in private breach of contracts settings where compensation is the
conventional remedy and goal. Surpassing compensation is more familiar and
palatable where there is a high desire to prevent the unjust enrichment,
especially when coupled with a possible breach of other duties.172
Some scholars claim that disgorgement punishes. If calibrated properly to
the profit wrongfully obtained,173 disgorgement simply undoes that improper
employees and relying on a House of Lords example focusing not on the government’s loss but instead
on the wrongdoer’s gain by misuse of its position).
168. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015).
169. Id. at 1057.
170. Id. (“[T]his Court may order disgorgement of gains, if needed to stabilize a compact and
deter future breaches, when a State has demonstrated reckless disregard of another, more vulnerable
State’s rights under that instrument.”).
171. Id.
172. See infra Section III.A.
173. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980). The Court authorized a constructive trust remedy over ex-Central Intelligence Agent’s
wrongful profits earned from a book published without prepublication clearance, though not containing
classified information. Id. at 511, 515. The Court viewed the behavior as a fiduciary breach warranting
the imposition of a constructive trust over his book publication royalties. Id. at 515. Scholars, myself
included, have criticized the reasoning in Snepp. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement,
68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1419 n.25 (2016); Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts
of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1034 n.34 (2011). Snepp violated his contractual duty but
did not breach his fiduciary duty because he did not publish classified information. Snepp, 444 U.S.
509–10. It is also less than clear that defendant profited from property belonging to the government.
See id. at 508–09. Further, the Court did not analyze how to trace the wrongful profits versus the
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gain. It does not also then treble or otherwise multiply the award to punish
defendant.174 It only strips away the gain that would be unjust to retain.
Disgorgement does take gain that defendant had no right to make. This serves
to deter and prevent unjust enrichment and conscious advantage-taking.
Does service of a deterrence function automatically convert the remedy to
a punitive one? If crafted to vindicate a public interest and punish a wrongdoer,
then definitely yes. Is it possible, however, to exceed compensation in order to
deter but not punish a defendant who consciously takes without asking? That
is the goal of restitution.

profits Snepp had every right to make. See id. at 507, 515–16. If, for example, Snepp had to surrender
all royalties from his book, the remedy neither calibrates to which parts of the book were as a result of
classified information nor which parts Snepp earned through his own untainted merit. If one
reimagines the wrong as an opportunistic breach of contract where the breach is failure to ask
permission in advance, a disgorgement of all profits thus wrongfully made may be warranted. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 39, cmt. d, illus. 4 & Reporter’s
Note d (AM. LAW. INST. 2011). A complete strip of profits (or imposition of a constructive trust over
all of profits earned), however, runs the risk of overreaching if the real intent is to punish bluntly. The
lower court suggested punitive damages would have been a preferable route. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.
The comparable, famous case of the Commonwealth, Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (H.L.)
(Eng.), fares a bit better due to tighter reasoning, though Blake is not without its critics. See, e.g.,
JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 149 (2002); Mitchell McInnes, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: The Search for a
Principled Relationship, in UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT 225, 241 (E.J.H.
Schrage ed., 2001); Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in
Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 115, 117, n.7 (2000); Robert Stevens, Damages
and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not, in EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW (Jason W.
Neyers, Richard Bronaugh, & Stephen G.A. Pitel eds., 2009) (maintaining that Blake invented the
disgorgement remedy though lacking precedent); see also John D. McCamus, Disgorgement for
Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 943 (2003).
174. Congress could draft legislation with additional remedial functions to address punitive
goals. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (providing for recovery of “threefold the damages” sustained
and costs). If labeled punitive, however, other consequences may arise such as tax implications.
DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at 324 n.449 (explaining the taxable nature of punitive versus
compensatory awards).
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Economic theory175 poses a counterargument that a disgorgement remedy
may exceed the goal of optimal deterrence.176 The theory of deterrence asks:
what is the least quotient of remedy that can achieve deterrence?177 To go
beyond that amount would be overkill. Thus, if compensation will do, then
disgorgement might be excessive in achieving a partial deterrence goal. An
optimal deterrence theory might dictate that the cost of deterrence not exceed
the cost of the action being deterred. These points are worth considering,
though disgorgement should be able to overcome the challenge for at least some
of the possible emolument violations.
Disgorgement should be available, if not preferred, for three reasons. First,
a lesser remedy such as compensation may be unattainable and undesirable
given that emoluments violations most often do not cause commensurate loss
to putative plaintiffs. The exception would be competitor hotels; however,
those losses may suffer from proof problems such as causation.178 Second,
restitution-based remedies such as disgorgement should not punish if applied
properly to the offensive behavior and measured correctly. It is true that proper
application and measurement will require finesse, but it is worth pursuing.
Appropriately attained disgorgement would not punish and ideally would not
over-deter. The reply to that assertion is that disgorgement achieves complete
deterrence because it strips all gain.179 To a law-and-economics advocate
175. Consideration of this counterargument is part of this Article’s effort to increase dialogue
between remedies scholars and law and economic theorists, as there is much insight to be gained even
if the two groups at times operate with distinct value choices in mind. For a thoughtful treatment on
why this dialogue is important, see Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet
Remedies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (2018) (noting the startling lack of conversation, detailing
the dangers of misconceptions, and suggesting deeper collaboration between the two fields).
176. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 160–63 (1987); cf. Huang, supra note 135, at 1599–601 (noting that disgorging net gain does not
force defendant to suffer a loss, permitting defendant to break even). Professor Huang argues that
using disgorgement as a remedy some of the time may emulate the incentives of applying other
compensatory remedies all of the time. Id. at 1599, 1605. He posits that this flexibility may be helpful
when harm is difficult to measure. Id. at 1599–601, 1621–24. In contractual cases, the expectation
remedy may lead to over-reliance by the nonbreaching party; whereas, disgorgement may cause the
breaching party to over-rely. Yehonatan Givati & Yotam Kaplan, Over-Reliance Under Contractual
Disgorgement, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 82 (2018).
177. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
79 (1982); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1143 (1989). But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000) (offering two studies to demonstrate that people
do not believe in optimal deterrence).
178. See supra Section II.C.1.
179. Complete deterrence’s purpose is to ensure defendant never chooses the wrongful behavior.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421,
421 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and
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complete deterrence is not preferable to optimal, partial deterrence. It simply
goes farther than necessary to achieve the desired goal of deterrence. If
calibrated correctly, it is possible not to strip all gain, though in practice
achieving this goal may be difficult. To attempt the achievement, the factfinder
would need to discern which part of the gain is unjust. Did defendant contribute
lawfully to the creation of profit in such a way that justifies retention of some
part of the enrichment? Third, for some disgorgement may be preferable
because optimal deterrence is not as important as preventing the unjust
enrichment or eliminating corruption, especially where the enrichment occurs
from conscious-advantage taking without asking or in reckless disregard of the
interests of others or a paramount public interest. This feature is especially true
where an injunction would have been warranted ex ante, but it becomes too late
to achieve it. For example, the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s requirement of
congressional consent is a constitutionally mandated permission lever, but it
may be too late to stop the objectionable conduct. Accordingly, if one took
without asking, disgorgement would be the proper remedy.
Ample precedent exists for using disgorgement as a powerful remedy for
federal statutory violations.180 It is true that disgorgement is not always deemed
an option for violation of certain federal laws. For example, disgorgement is
no longer available as a remedy for utility patent infringement due to the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of statutory amendments regarding the lawequity divide.181
For emoluments, Congress ideally would authorize
disgorgement, identify proper plaintiffs, and clarify the law-equity distinction
for the purposes of jury trial rights and applicable defenses. Even in the absence
of any statutory authorization, disgorgement of unjust enrichment is a viable
emoluments remedy under the common law.

Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 486, 489 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013)
(“The primary goal of gain elimination is the complete deterrence of socially unproductive
activities . . . .”).
180. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1946) (disgorging profits
gained from federal statutory violation).
181. Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 665–89 (2010) (criticizing the Court’s determination that
disgorgement is not an available remedy under the revised statute).
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C. Unjust Enrichment and Emoluments
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment sets forth
the basic liability for unjust enrichment in the first section: “A person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution.”182 The phrase “at the expense of another,” does not require a loss
by plaintiff, but instead means “‘in violation of the other’s legally protected
rights,’ without the need to show that the claimant has suffered a loss.”183 This
feature of unjust enrichment renders a claim that should not fail even though
plaintiff cannot allege loss.184
A critical feature of unjust enrichment and disgorgement in particular is
that they are not designed to compensate plaintiff. Though recovery may
exceed compensation, the purpose is not to punish. Instead, restitution
remedies like disgorgement are meant to strip defendant’s unjust enrichment
and deter conscious advantage-taking.
Two specific sections of the Restatement have particular relevance with
respect to possible emoluments. The first involves fiduciary or confidential
relations.185 Another covers interference with other protected interests.186
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
183. Id. § 1, cmt. a.
184. Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2,
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339).
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43:
A person who obtains a benefit
(a) in breach of a fiduciary duty,
(b) in breach of an equivalent duty imposed by a relation of trust and
confidence, or
(c) in consequence of another’s breach of such a duty,
is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed.
186. Id. § 44:
(1) A person who obtains a benefit by conscious interference with a claimant’s
legally protected interests (or in consequence of such interference by another) is
liable in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, unless competing
legal objectives make such liability inappropriate.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1), interference with legally protected interests
includes conduct that is tortious, or that violates another legal duty or prohibition
(other than a duty imposed by contract), if the conduct constitutes an actionable
wrong to the claimant.
(3) Restitution by the rule of this section will be limited or denied
(a) if the court would refuse to enjoin the interference, assuming timely
application and an absence of procedural or administrative obstacles;
(b) to the extent it would result in an inappropriate windfall to the claimant,
or would otherwise be inequitable in a particular case;
(c) if the benefit derived from the interference cannot be adequately measured;
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Under a fiduciary theory, additional support may exist in the Constitution’s
Take Care Clause: “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”187 Other scholars have articulated this as a substantive
theory.188 Disgorgement is also suggested as one of the possible remedies.189
To the extent a contractual relationship exists in the first instance between
a plaintiff and the government official in question, then it is also worth
considering whether there is an opportunistic breach of contract that warrants
disgorgement of profits.190 For example, the American Law Institute suggests
reconceptualizing Snepp191 as an opportunistic breach of contract to disgorge
wrongful gains,192 access to the remedy reframed as disgorgement thus requires
an opportunistic breach of contract. An opportunistic breach theory against any
government official depends on the wording of relevant contracts with a focus
on any clauses on exclusivity or covenants regarding loyalty and
confidentiality.
IV. REMEDYING EMOLUMENTS VIOLATIONS
A. Whistleblower Legislation
1. Congress’s Power to Legislate Against Emoluments
The Foreign Emoluments Clause does not expressly grant authority to
Congress to regulate against emoluments.193 Congress possesses the power,
or
(d) if allowance of the claim would conflict with liabilities or penalties for the
interference provided by other law.
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
188. See Leib & Shugerman, supra note 106, at 485 (advancing a theory of fiduciary
constitutionalism).
189. Id. at 487 (“Public fiduciary duties, then, can have straightforward (and literal) juridical
applications with fairly conventional remedies one would see in the private law: constructive trusts,
accounting, injunctions, and damages with a view to disgorgement.”). The listed remedies are
prevalent in public and private litigation. A minor clarification: disgorgement as this Article proposes
it would be linked to restitution and unjust enrichment and therefore would not constitute a type of
damages, neither compensatory nor punitive damages.
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39.
191. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); see also supra note 173 (analyzing Snepp and
listing sources critical of its reasoning).
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, cmt. d, illus. 4
& reporter’s note d; see also Nicholas W. Sage, Disgorgement: From Property to Contract, 66 U.
TORONTO L.J. 244, 259 (2016) (analogizing to breach of negative covenant cases).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.

ROBERTS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/22/2019 5:57 PM

DISGORGING EMOLUMENTS

37

however, as a matter of implication via the constitutional phrase “without the
Consent of the Congress.”194 The invocation of congressional consent suggests
Congress prospectively could regulate law within its consent power. This
dynamic is comparable to congressional assent to state compacts.195
By analogy to compact power,196 Congress possesses the power to legislate
regarding emoluments violations and proper remedies. With respect to
compacts, Congress can pass legislation incident to its compact power. A
variety of cases explore the parameters of the compact power.197 The power to
legislate is broad, though the remedial provisions may abuse that power if, for
example, the encroachment on state sovereignty is excessive.198 For
emoluments legislation, this limitation is not a concern because the exercise of
power would be on the federal level. Boundaries, if any, would arise by virtue
of separation-of-powers concerns rather than federalism constraints. Because
the Constitution gives Congress explicit power to consent to emoluments,

194. Id. Litigation over a presidential attempt to block congressional oversight subpoenas sheds
light on the breadth of Congress’s powers in this arena:
Courts have grappled for more than a century with the question of the scope of
Congress’s investigative power. The binding principle that emerges from these
judicial decisions is that courts must presume Congress is acting in furtherance of its
constitutional responsibility to legislate and must defer to congressional judgments
about what Congress needs to carry out that purpose. To be sure, there are limits on
Congress’s investigative authority. But those limits do not substantially constrain
Congress. So long as Congress investigates on a subject matter on which ‘legislation
could be had,’ Congress acts as contemplated by Article I of the Constitution.
Applying those principles here compels the conclusion that President Trump
cannot block the subpoena. . . . According to the Oversight Committee, it believes
that the requested records will aid its consideration of strengthening ethics and
disclosure laws, as well as amending the penalties for violating such laws. The
Committee also says that the records will assist in monitoring the President’s
compliance with the Foreign Emoluments Clause. These are facially valid legislative
purposes . . . . Accordingly, the court will enter judgment in favor of the Oversight
Committee.
Trump v. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 380 F. Supp. 3d 76, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2019).
195. An example of state compacts requiring congressional approval is interstate water-rights
compacts. See, e.g., The Republican River Compact. Pub. L. No. 78-60, 57 Stat. 86 (1943).
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015) (interstate water-rights
compact); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (tribe and state compact on gaming
activities); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 151–52 (1992) (regional waste compact).
198. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186–88 (severing unconstitutional legislative
incentive essentially mandating state action in specific ways).
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Congress should possess the power to regulate emoluments. Indeed, Congress
has already passed legislation under an implied emoluments power.199
It may be preferable that Congress rather than private litigants sets the
policies and boundaries of emoluments. Congress could consider which
individuals or entities should garner a right to sue, but it may determine the core
of the interest is the government itself. Yet the government likely needs to
uncover hidden information to assess possible violations. Whistleblowers, in
the form of government officials or private confidants, may strike an ideal
balance. They possess inside information and a statute could provide the
government incentive to obtain information it might not otherwise obtain. The
information gathering and sharing incentive also aids political remedies of
citizens who cannot sue because they raise only generalized grievances; they
do have a right to vote out an elected government official but cannot effectively
do so without greater accountability. A whistleblower statute would aid
accountability by bringing concealed information into the public arena.
Regardless of whom Congress may determine is the preferred litigant to
right such wrongs, disgorgement is the best path to protect any such right. To
best protect the right, Congress is best suited to determine materiality thresholds
and the contours of emoluments strike the public trust and fidelity of
government. Once those boundaries are set, Congress also should consider the
remedies best designed to undo and deter the precise harms.
Several avenues exist to provide relief for constitutional emoluments
violations. Congress could use its power to establish a private right of action.200
It could further provide a catalogue of preferred remedies and the goals to be
served. Alternatively, Congress could designate, but limit, remedies to the
federal government.201 Without legislative action or guidance, lawyers would

199. For example, in 1966, Congress authorized in the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act a
general statutory consent to the acceptance of specific minimal gifts and other tangible gifts and
decorations. Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-673, 80 Stat. 952 (1966).
Congress later clarified exceptions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, P.L. 95-105, 91 Stat. 862 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7342
(2011)). Prior to 1966, Congress often passed legislation explicitly approving a foreign gift or
decoration. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43660, THE RECEIPT OF GIFTS BY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 7 (2014) (citing CLARENCE CANNON, 7 CANNON’S
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 1889 (1935); S. REP. NO. 89-1160 (1966);
CONSTITUTION – JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 145;
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2052 (1966)).
200. See infra Section IV.A.2.
201. See infra Section IV.A.2.
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be wise to consider incorporating into their complaints a common law unjust
enrichment claim for a restitutionary disgorgement remedy.202
2. Legislating an Emoluments Disgorgement Remedy
If the government were to craft such emoluments legislation, it should
include a restitutionary disgorgement remedy. This scheme would prevent
unjust enrichment and deter corruption. If Congress were to regulate in this
arena, it should consider private rights of action and whistleblower options.
Creating particularized liability would alleviate the temptation for generalized
grievance litigation. Congress should also use the opportunity to legislate the
preferred remedy that would best serve the interests at stake and deter
potentially egregious behavior.
At minimum, Congress could pass legislation that creates a private right to
sue for aggrieved persons. For example, Washington D.C. hotel owners who
lost typical customers who opted to stay at the President’s hotel instead. Private
law will shape public law. A congressional statute gives a political branch the
opportunity to help shape the boundaries. Congress need not go the full
distance of the constitutional grant, but it could weigh in regarding desired
bounds. It could draw the line between speculative claims of prospective
customers and claims exhibiting a reasonable likelihood of such customers but
for the Executive’s competing property. Regarding the remedy, Congress could
utilize other methods of damages than disgorgement such as actual damages or
statutory damages, but disgorgement would best serve the goals of undoing and
deterring unjust enrichment. Actual damages would be difficult to prove, but
if proven would serve a pure compensation function. Statutory damages would
eliminate the proof problem but likely attempt to approximate plaintiff’s loss
rather than defendant’s wrongful gains.
An alternative proposed legislation scheme could model the False Claims
Act,203 which authorizes qui tam suits brought by a whistleblower on behalf of
the government.204 The False Claims Act gives the government an option to
enter the litigation or simply await partial recovery upon a whistleblower’s
successful suit.205 Congress could create a similar scheme for those that come
forward with particular information of unlawful conduct by a federal
government officer. The statute would define the parameters of eligible
202. See infra Section IV.B.
203. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
204. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1152 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991)
(explaining “‘qui tam’ is taken from the Latin expression qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur, meaning ‘who brings the action for the king as well as for himself’”); see also
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1768).
205. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–30 (2012).
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whistleblowers and the percentage of recovery, but such a suit would be on
behalf of the government. This method may be preferable because it protects
the public interest and, by disgorging wrongful profits, it shifts those gains to
the government and deters future unjust gains. The whistleblower would
receive some portion as an incentive to serve as a private attorney general.
In the past, the White House has sought governmental advice in compliance
with governmental ethics regulations. The Office of Government Ethics,
however, does not cover and cannot enforce emoluments without congressional
authorization.206 Congress could create a role for the Office of Government
Ethics207 or determine that other entities are better suited to carry forward
governmental aims of anti-corruption, anti-self-dealing, accountability, and
fidelity to the country and the office.
A possible criticism of the proposed legislative-remedial path is that
restitution should not be used to give a plaintiff (the government or the
whistleblower) something to which they had no preexisting or future right to
have. It is not the government’s profit to make. These are profits no
government officer or entity should make. So, unlike the False Claims Act,
which in essence returns defrauded monies to the government, disgorgement of
emoluments may give to the government money it never had and never would
have had. An emoluments restitutionary recovery would rarely if ever
constitute a windfall given the rarity of such violations and the relative amount
of money compared to the overall federal budget.
If, however, we view the unlawful behavior as a breach of fiduciary trust
or parallel to an opportunistic breach of contract, then disgorgement still merits
serious consideration. Modern restitution law has evolved from simple
restoration of property to the undoing of any enrichment one lacks justification
to retain. Aristotle advocated that such imbalances to society’s just equilibrium
cannot be sustained.208 The restitution remedy of disgorgement ensures that a
206. The mission of the Office (OGE) is to “[p]rovide overall leadership and oversight of the
executive branch ethics program designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest,” but it does “not
handle complaints of misconduct, nor does OGE have investigative or prosecutorial authority. OGE’s
mission is one of prevention.” Mission and Responsibilities, UNITED STATES OFFICE OF GOV’T
ETHICS,
https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Mission%20and%20Responsibilities
[https://perma.cc/4LYD-SP2E] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
207. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON RULE
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 6 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_TaskForceReport_2018_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/E42D-AZPR].
208. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 86–88 (David Ross trans., Oxford University
Press 2009); cf. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,
46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (applying Aristotelean theory to show how the restitution interest provides
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wrongdoer is unable to retain profits that are kept without legal justification or
otherwise violative.
Another point of consideration is whether Congress or the courts should
resolve which profits are traceable to the violation. Should a government
officer be able to keep any profits made? As a matter of policy, Congress would
be wise to determine if the emoluments prohibitions should constitute a flat ban
in which case all profits constituting wrongful emoluments would be
recoverable. Still there may be issues if blended profits exist, and Congress
could determine which party bears the burden of either proving causation versus
warranting an offset for efforts to make any lawful portion of the gains.
Disgorgement of profits for certain intellectual property violations would offer
insights into statutory issues Congress should consider and perhaps resolve.209
B. Failsafe of Unjust Enrichment as a Common Law Claim
Without congressional legislation, unjust enrichment law can provide
avenues to recovery. As a matter of best practices, congressional involvement
would be beneficial to help set the policy parameters of unconstitutional
emoluments. If Congress is unable to accomplish this goal, private and public
litigants would be wise to study the common law of unjust enrichment and
restitution. As outlined in this Article,210 the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment provides many avenues to address wrongdoing that
often may fall between the cracks of other bodies of law.
Unjust enrichment can serve as the basis of a freestanding cause of action
or its theory can provide the foundation for restitutionary remedies that attach
to other substantive bodies of law such as breaches of fiduciary duties. As a
freestanding matter, one has no right to retain benefits without legal
justification or in violation of any other legal duty. Private corners of the law
may provide helpful resolutions to breaches of gray or overlapping areas of the
law that existing remedies either fall to capture or address inadequately for
protection of the rights and their attendant goals. Regardless of the path, the

greater justification for relief, but doing so in a binary relationship setting where “A not only causes B
to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not
one unit but two.”). Modern restitution law does not require that B lose something that A gains; rather,
it is enough that B has gained something B has no right to retain and thus should disgorge. I argue that
it is more important to see the basis for the disgorgement remedy, then determine whether B is the
proper plaintiff under the instant conception of an unjust enrichment theory for disgorging unlawful
emoluments.
209. See supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text (discussing difficult issues in unclear
boundaries to disgorgement in design-patent legislation and litigation).
210. See supra Section III.C (outlining possible relevant sections of the Restatement to
emolument concerns).
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restitutionary remedy of disgorgement of wrongful gains is a remedy that would
undo the unjust enrichment, prevent opportunism and corruption, and deter
future temptations for accepting and hiding questionable emoluments.
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the precise parameters of unlawful emoluments, proof may show
that certain emoluments represent benefits unjustly derived from a person’s
service to the public. If so, their receipt should be deterred. If received by a
covered government actor, emoluments constitute unjust enrichment and are
violative of the Constitution. A powerful remedy should lie. The ideal remedy
to rectify the harm is disgorgement of improper gains. This Article articulates
why disgorgement will best serve desired goals such as anti-corruption and antiself-dealing. Pending emoluments lawsuits continue to face constitutional
hurdles and may not be the best route to shaping the contours of the right and
ensuring application of ideal remedies that serve the underlying goals. This
Article proposes legislation to ensure a clear path to the restitutionary remedy
of disgorgement when violations of the Emoluments Clauses arise.

